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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ISOM LEE HUDSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
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)
)
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)
)

NO. 46167-2018
MINIDOKA COUNTY NO. CR-2016-2071

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Isom Hudson contends the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation and executed his sentence because it did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors
in his case. Those factors showed that continuing the term of probation would, in fact, serve the
dual goals of probation. In fact, his probation officer was initially inclined to pursue that option
in this case.
Alternatively, Mr. Hudson asserts the district court abused its discretion when it expressly
considered whether to exercise its authority to sua sponte reduce his sentence, but decided not to
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do so. The information in the record demonstrated that a reduced sentence would better serve all
the goals of sentencing.
As such, this Court should either reverse the order revoking probation and executing
Mr. Hudson’s underlying sentence, or it should vacate the order executing that sentence without
modification. In either case, this Court should then remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Despite the district court’s reservations about Mr. Hudson’s ability to complete a rider
program given to his age, 1 Mr. Hudson successfully completed a period of retained jurisdiction
following his conviction for DUI in this case. (Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report
(hereinafter, APSI), pp.1-2 (recommending probation upon completion of assigned programs);
see Supp. Tr., p.23, Ls.1-22 (the district court articulating its concerns); Supp. R., pp.129-31 (the
initial judgment of conviction).) Though he struggled with course assignments throughout the
period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Hudson was ultimately able to integrate and complete his
assigned classes. (APSI, p.5.) He did not receive any formal or informal disciplinary reports
during his time in the rider program. (APSI, p.3.) As a result, the district suspended his sentence
(a unified term of ten years, with four years fixed) for a five-year term of probation. (Supp.
R., Aug. p.1.)2
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Mr. Hudson was 57 years old at the time. (Supp. Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
Supp. PSI), p.1.) “Supp.” refers to the record and transcript prepared for Mr. Hudson’s initial
appeal in this case, Docket Number 45137, which the Supreme Court ordered augmented to the
record for this appeal. (R., p.85.)
2
In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court ordered that the record be augmented with the Judgment
After Retained Jurisdiction. (Order Granting Motion to Augment the Record, dated January 2,
2018.) Since that judgment does not otherwise appear in either of the clerk’s records, references
thereto will use its “Aug.” page numbers.

2

Several months later, the State filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.30-31.) At
the evidentiary hearing on that motion, Mr. Hudson’s probation officer testified that he had seen
Mr. Hudson driving a car despite having a suspended driver’s license. (Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.9, L.5.)
The probation officer testified that, when he saw Mr. Hudson get out of the car, Mr. Hudson was
carrying a brown paper bag which the probation officer suspected might contain alcohol.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.14-17.) He testified that, as he was off-duty at the time, he did not confront
Mr. Hudson, but instead, conducted an interview with him a few days later. (Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.)
During that interview, Mr. Hudson made written admissions that, along with buying some items
for himself, he bought a beer for his mother and he had taken a drink of that beer. (Tr., p.10,
L.11 - p.11, L.8; Exhibits, pp.1-2.) The probation officer also testified that Mr. Hudson had
verbally admitted that he knew his license was still suspended. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-11.)
The probation officer acknowledged that Mr. Hudson had been compliant with the terms
of his probation up to that point. (Tr., p.14, Ls.15-16.) As such, the probation officer testified
that, at the end of that interview, he had given Mr. Hudson the impression that the matter would
be addressed through intermediate sanctions, not a motion for probation violation or jail time.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.2-7.) Defense counsel subsequently explained that the probation officer had been
recommending that Mr. Hudson be reinstated on probation with the additional condition that he
participate in the DUI Court program. 3 (Tr., p.22, Ls.15-20.) It was not until the probation
officer reviewed the case with his supervisor that he decided to issue an agent’s warrant and file
the report of violation. (Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.1.) Mr. Hudson was understandably upset when
he was informed of the change in the probation officer’s decision, and he was uncooperative and
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There is no indication in the record as to whether or not Mr. Hudson was actually staffed for
admission into the DUI Court program. (See generally R.)
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verbally abusive when he was arrested. (See Tr., p.15, L.16 - p.16, L.7; see also Tr., p.23, Ls.1-9
(defense counsel noting that, while this information gave context to Mr. Hudson’s behavior, it
did not excuse that behavior).)
At the prosecutor’s request, the district court took judicial notice of the judgement of
conviction and the judgment after retained jurisdiction, as well as the terms of probation (which
had been attached to the probation officer’s report of probation violation, which the State had
submitted with its motion for probation violation). (Tr., p.16, Ls.18-24, p.17, Ls.6-10; see Supp.
R., pp.129-31; Supp. R., Aug. pp.1-2; R., pp.24-27.) It found, based on the probation officer’s
testimony and Mr. Hudson’s written admissions, that Mr. Hudson had willfully violated two of
the terms of his probation. (Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.1.) At Mr. Hudson’s request, the matter
proceeded immediately to disposition. (Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24.)
Defense counsel noted that Mr. Hudson had been able to maintain employment while on
probation, and pointed out that, when he could not make other arrangements, Mr. Hudson would
walk to where he needed to go, even though it was the middle of winter. 4 (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-14;
Tr., p.25, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Hudson explained that this included walking between the towns of
Rupert and Burley, and the probation officer also noted that Mr. Hudson lived outside the
town of Paul. (Tr., p.7, L.23, p.25, Ls.9-11.) In addition to working at his job, Mr. Hudson had
been serving as a caretaker for his ailing mother. (Tr., p.23, L.19, p.26, Ls.20-22.) As such,
Mr. Hudson requested the district court not execute his sentence at this point in time. (Tr., p.23,
Ls.20-23.)
The district court acknowledged that this was “not the wors[t] possible probation
violation,” but it was a significant one given the nature of the underlying offense. (Tr., p.27,
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Mr. Hudson was released on probation in December 2017. (Tr., p.6, Ls.7-13.)
4

Ls.9-18.) It also reviewed information about Mr. Hudson’s criminal history and his attitude
about his history. 5 (Tr., p.28, L.8 - p.29, L.21.) Based on those considerations, it concluded
probation was not serving either of the goals of probation, and so, it revoked Mr. Hudson’s
probation and executed his underlying sentence. (Tr., p.30, Ls.6-9.) The district court also noted
it had the authority to reduce Mr. Hudson’s sentence sua sponte, but it ultimately decided not to
exercise that authority. 6 (Tr., p.30, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Hudson filed a notice of appeal timely from
the order revoking his probation. (R., pp.44, 48.)

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by revoking Mr. Hudson’s probation and
executing his underlying sentence.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided not to exercise its
authority to reduce Mr. Hudson’s sentence sua sponte.
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For example, the district court noted the probation officer’s testimony that, when he confronted
Mr. Hudson with the alleged violations, Mr. Hudson’s response was that “[i]t’s only a problem if
you get caught.” (Tr., p.20, Ls.9-16; see Tr., p.13, Ls.8-9.)
6
The sentence the district court initially imposed exceeded the term jointly recommended by
trial counsel. (Compare Supp. R., p.93 (prosecutor agreeing to recommend a seven-year
sentence with two years fixed), and Supp. Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9 (defense counsel joining that
recommendation as to the underlying sentence) with Supp. Tr., p.26, Ls.17-19 (the district court
imposing a ten-year sentence, with four years fixed).) On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the
district court had not abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. State v. Hudson,
Docket No. 45137, 2018 WL 641395 (Ct. App. 2018), unpublished.
Mr. Hudson also filed a motion for leniency after the sentence was initially imposed, but
that motion was denied, in part, because no additional information was provided with the motion.
(Supp. R., pp.137, 144-45.)
5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Hudson’s Probation And Executing
His Underlying Sentence
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion. State v.
Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). A district court abuses its discretion when it fails
to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer limits of that discretion, does
not act consistently with the controlling precedent, or does not reach a decision based on an
exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). When deciding
whether or not to revoke probation, the district court must determine “whether the probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with
the protection of society.” Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. In this case, a sufficient consideration of
the mitigating factors reveals that the district court did not reach its decision through an exercise
of reason, particularly in regard to its decision that continuing Mr. Hudson’s probation would not
serve the goals of rehabilitation and protection of society.
Notably, Mr. Hudson’s probation officer did not consider this violation so serious as to
require revoking his probation. Likewise, the district court acknowledged that this was not the
most egregious of violations (though, as the district court pointed out, it was still a serious
matter). In fact, the probation officer told Mr. Hudson that this issue would likely be addressed
with intermediate sanctions, not a motion for violation or jail time. The fact that, in light of the
specific facts of this incident, Mr. Hudson’s probation officer still felt it would be appropriate for
Mr. Hudson to remain on probation, upon either the imposition of intermediate sanctions or the
addition of terms (such as participation in the DUI Court program), is particularly telling, as it
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belies the district court’s conclusion that continuing the term of probation would not serve either
of the goals of probation.
That conclusion is actually borne out by the fact that Mr. Hudson had otherwise been
compliant with the terms of his probation. Notably, Mr. Hudson was able to maintain his
employment and provide care for his ailing mother during that time despite having, at times, to
walk in winter conditions from his rural home to the nearby towns in order to get where he
needed to go. As such, the rehabilitative process which had begun during the period of retained
jurisdiction, was continuing while Mr. Hudson was on probation. That means, with the addition
of a few terms to help address and overcome the issues that led to this particular violation
(requiring the structure of the DUI court program, for example), continuing the period of
probation could still accomplish the goal of rehabilitation, and through that, the protection of
society.
Thus, by focusing as much as the district court did on Mr. Hudson’s past character (his
criminal history and his attitude in that regard), rather than on his present character, as it decided
whether continuing probation would serve the dual goals of probation, the district court failed to
reach its decision in an exercise of reason. As a result, that decision represents an abuse of its
discretion.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Decided Not To Exercise Its Authority To
Reduce Mr. Hudson’s Sentence Sua Sponte
The district court expressly recognized that it had the authority to reduce a sentence on its
own motion upon deciding to revoke probation. See State v. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 788 n.1

7

(Ct. App. 2014) (explaining this authority exists under I.C.R. 35).7 The decision of whether to
exercise this authority is left to the district court’s discretion. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520,
524-25 (Ct. App. 2008). When reviewing the district court’s decision of whether or not to
exercise that authority, the appellate court “examines all circumstances bearing upon the decision
to revoke probation and require execution of the sentence, including events that occurred
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation.” Id. In
other words, just because the sentence was not excessive as initially imposed, that does not mean
that subsequent events do not justify a subsequent reduction at the district court’s own motion.
To that point, the criteria for examining a decision to not grant such leniency “are the
same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v.
Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Those criteria require that a sentence address the
following goals:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public

generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 499 (1993). The protection of society is the primary
objective the sentencing court should consider. Id. at 500. However, the Idaho Supreme Court
has also indicated that rehabilitation is the first means the district court should consider to
achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds
as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
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In Clontz, the Court of Appeals held that the district court’s failure to reduce a sentence sua
sponte could not be challenged on appeal unless that issue was preserved below. Clontz, 156
Idaho at 792. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear, when the district court
expressly rules on an issue, as the district court did here in regard to its sua sponte authority, that
issue is preserved for appellate review. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (explaining
there is an exception to the traditional rules of preservation “when the issue was argued to or
decided by the trial court”) (emphasis added); accord State v. Vaughn, ___ P.3d ___, 2018 WL
4169335, *4 (Ct. App. 2018), petition for review pending.
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An examination of all the relevant circumstances in this case reveals that the district court
did not reach its decision to not exercise its authority sua sponte through an exercise of reason.
As a result, it abused its discretion. See Lunneborg, 163 Idaho 863-64. The events which
occurred between the original pronouncement of sentence and the revocation of probation – most
notably, Mr. Hudson’s performance in the rider program, through which he overcame the district
court’s reservations about his ability to do so, and his efforts to conform to the terms of his
probation and contribute to society during the time he was on probation which were discussed in
Section I, supra – reveal that a reduction in his sentence would better serve the goals of
sentencing. This is particularly true in this case, where the sentence originally imposed had
exceeded the term recommended by both Mr. Hudson and the prosecutor.
Thus, modifying the sentence to match the originally-recommended sentence would have
promoted the goal of rehabilitation by acknowledging Mr. Hudson’s efforts toward that goal,
particularly his efforts in the rider program, while the decision to execute that sentence would
serve the other goals of sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hudson respectfully requests this Court reverse the order revoking his probation and
executing his sentence and remand this case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests
this Court vacate the order executing his sentence without modification and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of January, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas
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